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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

Case No. 880206

v.
Category No. 2

RANALE MANE,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a conviction for Murder in the
Second Degree, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-5-203 (1978) (Supp. 1988); Attempted Murder in the
Second Degree, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-5-203 and 76-4-101 and 102 (1978) (Supp. 1988); and two
counts of Aggravated Assault, both third degree felonies, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1978).

This Court has

jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-22(3) (i) (1987) (Supp. 1988), because defendant was convicted of a
first degree felony.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether the charges of attempted homicide and

aggravated assault involving other victims were lesser included
offenses of the homicide involving Mike Brown, and whether the
trial court erred in refusing to dismiss them during trial.
2.

Whether the doctrine of merger precluded the

conviction and sentence of defendant for the attempted homicide

and aggravated assault charges in addition to the homicide
charge.
3.

Whether the trial court abused its discretion by

refusing to accept defendant's plea of guilty to one or two of
the charges during trial.
4.

Whether the trial court erred when it imposed

sentencing enhancements for the use of a firearm for each of the
felony convictions of defendant.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
For purposes of this brief, respondent relies on the
following provisions:
1.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-401 (1978),

2.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402 (1978),

3.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601 (1978),

4.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203 (1978)(Supp. 1988),

5.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (1978),

6.

Utah Code Ann. S 76-5-103 (1978),

7.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202 (1978) (Supp. 1988),

8.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1978) (Supp. 1988),

9.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-25(b)(2) (1982),

10.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(i) (1987) (Supp. 1988).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On December 21, 1987, Defendant, along with two others,
was charged with Murder in the First Degree, a capital offense,
in violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-5-202 (1978) (Supp. 1988);
Attempted Murder in the Second Degree, a second degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-5-203, S 76-4-101 and 102 (1978)

(Supp. 1988); and two counts of Aggravated Assault, both third
degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103
(1978).
After preliminary hearing, Defendant filed a Motion to
Dismiss the charges against him, claiming, inter alia, that the
Information was defective because it charged defendant with four
counts.

Defendant claimed that the Attempted Murder and

Aggravated Assault charges were lesser included offenses of the
Capital Murder charge (Record [hereinafter R.] at 100-101).

The

trial court received memoranda from counsel and then denied the
motion, stating that it was without merit (R. at 116).
Jury trial for defendant was held March 21 through 25,
1988, in the Fourth Judicial District Court in and for Utah
County, with the Honorable Boyd L. Park, District Judge,
presiding.

The jury found defendant guilty of Murder in the

Second Degree, a lesser included offense to the Capital Murder
charge, Attempted Murder, and both counts of Aggravated Assault.
After a presentence report was prepared, the court
received information from counsel regarding sentencing then
pronounced the sentence as follows:
Count I - Murder in the Second Degree, a
First Degree Felony. The defendant is
sentenced to the Utah State Prison for a term
of not less than five years, and which maybe
[sic] for life, plus an additonal [sic] one
year for the use of a firearm in the
commission of the crime, to run consecutively
with a five year minimum term. This term
shall be for not less than six years.
Count II - Attempted Murder in the Second
Degree, a Second Degree Felony. The
defendant is sentenced to the Utah State
Prison for a term of not less than one year
nor more than fifteen years, plus an

additional one year for the use of a firearm
in the commission of the crime to run
consecutively with the one year minimum term.
This sentence shall be for not less than two
years.
Count III - Aggravated Assault, a Third
Degree Felony. The defendant is sentenced to
the Utah State Prison for an indeterminate
term not to exceed five years and for an
additional indeterminate term not to exceed
five years for use of a firearm to run
consecutively and not concurrently.
Count IV - Aggravated Assault, a Third
Degree Felony. The defendnt [sic] is
sentenced to the Utah State Prison for an
indetermiante [sic] term not to exceed five
years and for an additional indeterminate
term not to exceed five years for use of a
firearm to run consecutively and not
concurrently.
The sentences on each separate count shall
run consecutively and not concurrently.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On the evening of December 19, 1987, defendant and a
friend, Savelio Fuga, went to a bar called the Silver Spur in
downtown Provo (Transcript of trial [hereinafter T.] at 797-98).
At the door as they entered was an employee of the bar named Tom
Tromley who was collecting the admission fee from patrons and
also serving as a bouncer (T. at 794-95).

Also employed as

bouncers there that Saturday night were Mike Brown and Poponatui
Fifita (T. at 796, 836 and 958). The bar had engaged a band that
evening and a sizeable crowd built up over the course of the
evening, eventually numbering 175-200 people (T. at 798, 805-806
and 847) .
Tromley recalled that defendant and Fuga arrived about
7:30 p.m. and questioned their need to pay the admission fee (T.
at 798). After Tromley explained the purpose for the fee,
defendant and Fuga paid the fee then went to the bar and ordered

a pitcher of beer and sat at the bar (T. at 804). Defendant and
Fuga continued ordering pitchers of beer, two at a time, until
they had consumed three pitchers apiece and then they ordered a
fourth pitcher for each of them (T. at 1046).
Tromley continued working at the door until
approximately 9:30 p.m. when the manager approached him and told
him to go toward the back of the bar near the restrooms where
there was a fight in progress (T. at 805). At this point
approximately 175-200 people were in the bar (T. at 847).
Tromley found defendant and another patron fighting and
immediately grabbed defendant to eject him from the bar (T. at
808-10).

Tromley told both of the combatants that they had to

leave because the bar rule was that all people involved in a
fight are ejected (T. at 810). Tromley tried to take defendant
out but defendant locked his arms around a pillar and refused to
leave (T. at 810). Fifita, one of the other bouncers, approached
defendant and suggested that they go outside and settle down (T.
at 810). As Fifita approached Tromley and defendant, he saw Fuga
throw a couple of punches at Tromley (T. at 963). Defendant and
Fifita went outside with Tromley following them (T. at 810).
Fuga followed along (T. at 810).
Tromley went back into the bar and grabbed the other
patron who had been involved in the fight and took him outside
(T. at 811). That man tried to convince Tromley that the fight
was not his fault and that he should not be ejected but Tromley
told him of the rule and walked him toward his car.

The patron

got in his vehicle and left (T. at 811). Fifita was still

talking to defendant and Fuga as Tromley walked back into the bar
to resume his duties at the door (T. at 812). Defendant and Fuga
tried to convince Fifita to let them back in so that they could
finish the two pitchers of beer that they had just purchased (T.
at 964 and 1046).

They argued with Fifita until he finally told

them to go in and talk to Tromley about getting back in (T. at
964-65).

They opened the door and Tromley pointed out the door,

indicating that they were not to return (T. at 812). Defendant
and Fuga opened the door again and acted as if they were going to
"bolt" in (T. at 812). Tromley grabbed them by their shirt
fronts and pushed them back out the door and defendant swung a
fist and hit Tromley (T. at 812). The three started struggling,
with Fifita trying to intervene, and Tromley's shirt was torn off
(T. at 813). Fifita took hold of defendant and Fuga, then
Tromley headed back into the bar to protect the till which he had
left when forcing defendant and Fuga out (T. at 813). As Tromley
walked back in, defendant told him that defendant was going to
get a gun and come back and kill Tromley (T. at 813 and 1050).
Defendant turned to Fuga and told him in Samoan to go get the gun
(T. at 1051).

Fuga then said to Tromley that they would return

at closing time and that they were going to "get" Tromley (T. at
814 and 1051) .
After Tromley went back into the building, Fifita heard
defendant say that he would be back with a gun and Fifita told
defendant and Fuga to just go home (T. at 966). The two walked
toward their vehicle then defendant turned around and told Fifita
not to tell Tromley about the threat to get a gun or Fifita would

"get it" (T. at 966). Defendant walked back to the car then
turned back to Fifita and grabbed his arms and told him to go
with defendant and Fuga (T. at 966). Fifita told them to just
leave (T. at 966-67) .
Tromley reported the incident to the police who arrived
at about 10:15 p.m. (T. at 814-15).

Defendant and Fuga were gone

when the police arrived and the officers stayed a brief time then
left (T. at 815). According to Fuga, he and defendant left the
bar and drove to Fuga's house (T. at 1052).

Defendant was angry

and pounded on the windshield of the car; he broke the seat of
the car, the rearview mirror and the handle on the passenger
window (T. at 1052-53).

Defendant demanded that Fuga get the gun

and swore when Fuga said that defendant had to go home (T. at
1053).

Fuga and defendant went to Fuga's house where they

retrieved a handgun and clip with bullets which Fuga had received
earlier in the year from a third codefendant as payment for a
debt (T. at 1055 and 1059).

Fuga took the gun and clip from a

briefcase in his bedroom closet and handed them to defendant who
inserted the clip into the gun (T. at 1055 and 1058).
Defendant and Fuga got into defendant's car which was
at Fuga's house so that when they returned to the bar no one
would recognized them by the vehicle (T. at 1061-62).

When they

got in the car, defendant pulled the slide on the gun into firing
position and placed the gun next to him on the car seat (T. at
1062-63).

The two drove to a friend's house but he was not home,

then they went to a 7-11 store and defendant bought two twelvepacks of beer (T. at 1065-66).

They drove to the house of a

codefendant, Lene Tauilili, but he was not home (T. at 1067-68).
They then drove to the Star Palace, a dancing establishment in
Provo, and asked Tauilili's brother to help them but he refused
(T. at 1068-69, 1473 and 1477).

Defendant told Fuga that he

wanted Tauilili's brother to go into the Silver Spur and see if
Tromley was at the front desk (T. at 1069).
When Tauilili's brother refused to help, defendant went
into the Star Palace and brought Tauilili out (T. at 1070).

With

Fuga driving, the three went back to Center Street and parked
across the street from the Silver Spur (T. at 1071-72).

On the

way, defendant told Tauilili of his fight with Tromley and
threatened to kill Fuga and Tauilili if they told anyone what
defendant was planning (T. at 1071-72).

Defendant told Tauilili

that Tauilili was to go in so that no one would recognize him (T.
at 1079).

When they had parked, defendant gave Tauilili money

for the cover charge and sent him in the bar to see where Tromley
was (T. at 1073).

Tauilili returned after 10 or 15 minutes and

defendant became angry with him and, in Samoan, said he was
"almost going to kill" Tauilili (T. at 1076).

Fuga tried to grab

the gun away from defendant but was unsuccessful (T. at 1078).
At defendant's insistence, Fuga moved the car to the north side
of Center Street, closer to the bar (T. at 1080).

Defendant took

the gun and got out of the car and walked toward the Silver Spur
(T. at 1080-81) .
At this time, which was about 12:45 a.m., the bar was
beginning to clear as the bouncers began moving people toward the
exit but there were still approximately 150 people inside, moving

toward the front door (T. at 824-25).

Tromley had gone outside

the bar to hail a taxi for a patron (T. at 815). While outside,
he was approached by a juvenile and asked to page the juvenile's
parents in the bar (T. at 815). At this point, he saw defendant
coming down the street toward the bar (T. at 815). Tromley went
inside to ask the band to page the juvenile's parents and, as he
passed Mike Brown, another bouncer, he told Brown that the guy
who had threatened to shoot him was outside (T. at 817). As
Tromley headed toward the band, Brown walked to the door (T. at
817).

When Tromley saw that, he ran back toward Brown and the

door and had his hand on Brown's shoulder when Brown opened the
door (T. at 817-18).

Right outside the door stood defendant (T.

at 818). Tromley told defendant that he could not come in and
defendant smiled and raised his right hand with the gun in it to
a level about chest high (T. at 818 and 820). Tromley turned
toward the bar in an effort to escape and heard three or four
shots fired as he turned away from the door (T. at 818 and 83940).

There were several people around the door because it was

closing time and the patrons had been leaving the bar (T. at 81819).

One woman, Becky Orr, was standing near the door and

Tromley pushed her out of the line of fire as he dove for the bar
(T. at 819 and 840-41).

After the initial shots, Tromley looked

over his left shoulder and saw defendant level the gun at him and
he heard two more shots as he dove behind a video arcade machine
at the bar (T. at 819 and 840-44).

Tromley then heard one more

shot which was muffled and he assumed came from outside the
building (T. at 819 and 841).

Scott Orr was a patron of the bar who had arrived with
his wife and his friends at about 8:30 p.m. and had danced and
drunk beer throughout the evening (T. at 916-17).

As the patrons

were leaving the bar at approximately 12:30 a.m., Orr walked to
the door, which was partially open, and pulled it open so that he
and his wife could exit (T. at 919). The band was through
playing, the lights had been turned on and there were at least
20-30 people standing immediately around the doorway, getting
ready to leave the bar (T. at 923 and 931). In the doorway was a
"[b]ig guyM who blocked the way so that Orr could not leave (T.
at 919). Orr assumed, correctly, that it was one of the bouncers
(Mike Brown) and waited for him to step aside so that the Orrs
could leave (T. at 919-20).

Orr heard a "popping noise" and

thought that someone had lit firecrackers (T. at 919-20 and 928).
He turned to his wife, who was right behind him, to make sure
that she hadn't stepped on the supposed firecrackers and felt a
"burning sensation" (T. at 920, 923 and 928). He turned back and
saw that Brown was no longer standing in front of him but was
lying on the ground (T. at 920 and 928-29).

He let the door

swing shut, realized that he had been shot, then heard more
gunshots from the other side of the door and moved away from
behind the door (T. at 920 and 928-30).

The last two shots that

he heard sounded as if they were right outside the door then he
didn't hear any more shots because of the noise and confusion as
people ran and screamed inside the bar (T. at 930)•

Orr had been

shot near the armpit with the bullet exiting toward the back (T.
at 820 and 921) .

Cliff Argyle and Bill Duncan were also at the Silver
Spur with some of their friends that evening (T. at 861-62).
They were the first ones leaving when Duncan bumped into
defendant just outside the doorway and defendant apologized (T.
at 864-65 and 875). Duncan responded as he and his friends kept
walking, then he heard what he thought were firecrackers coming
from behind them (T. at 865-66).

Duncan kept walking as he

slowly turned and glanced back toward the door of the bar (T. at
866).

He saw "fire" that appeared to be coming from defendant's

hand and aimed toward Mike Brown who was in the doorway three to
four feet from defendant (T. at 866-67).

Duncan heard a "couple

of . . . shots" and saw Brown slumping down (T. at 867),
Thinking it was a staged joke, he turned to one of his friends
then he heard a couple more shots and saw defendant look, then
start running, toward them (T. at 867). Defendant ran between
two of Duncan's friends who were walking five to ten feet behind
him and Argyle, then pointed the gun at Duncan (T. at 868). He
got closer and pointed the gun at Argyle and fired point blank,
hitting him in the back (T. at 868-69 and 904). The bullet
entered his back and travelled under the skin but outside the
ribcage, exited in the front and went through his wrist (T. at
904-905).
Meanwhile, inside the bar, Tromley stood up from behind
the arcade and thought that defendant had been shooting blanks
because he, Tromley, had not been hit (T. at 820). He saw Orr
leaning against the wall and thought Orr was joking when he said
that he had been shot, then Tromley saw the blood on Orr's shirt

and went to him and inspected the wound (T. at 820). Tromley
opened that door, expecting to see Brown holding defendant for
the police, but instead found Brown lying in front of the door
(T. at 820-21).

He held Brown until the paramedics arrived but

realized that the chance of recovery was slim when he saw that
the back of Brown's head was "about gone" (T. at 821).
Brown was transported to the Utah Valley Regional
Medical Center where he was pronounced dead of multiple gunshot
wounds at 3:05 a.m. (T. at 1140).

An autopsy revealed that Brown

had two gunshot wounds to the face which exited from the back and
side of his head, both passing through his brain (T. at 1150-51).
Brown also had a superficial wound from a bullet which entered
his chest, travelled under the skin then exited again from his
chest (T. at 1152).

The fourth wound was from a bullet which

entered his right buttock then came to rest in the left hip
socket (T. at 1152) .
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The charges of the attempted homicide of Tom Tromley
and the aggravated assaults of Scott Orr and Cliff Argyle are not
lesser included offenses of the homicide charge for the killing
of Mike Brown.

The four charges filed against defendant involved

four separate acts of firing a handgun and four separate victims.
While they were all part of a single criminal episode, the fact
that they were separate acts with separate victims allows them to
be charged as separate offenses.
The doctrine of merger does not preclude the charging
of the four separate offenses in this case.

That doctrine

provides that the predicate felony which is an aggravating
circumstance elevating a crime to capital homicide under Utah
Code Ann. S 76-5-202(1)(d) merges into the capital offense for
purposes of conviction and punishment.

This does not apply to

the charging of a capital offense along with other felonies so is
inapplicable in the present case because defendant was not
convicted of a capital crime.

Neither were the attempted

homicide and aggravated assault charges predicate felonies under
that section.

Defendant was charged with the aggravating

circumstance of creating a great risk of death to a person other
than the victim and the actor.

The fact that he emptied his

handgun into a crowded bar with at least 20-30 people in the
immediate vicinity supports that charging of this factor as an
aggravating circumstance even if no one else had been wounded.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it
refused to accept defendant's offer to plead guilty to a less
serious offense when, as in this case, defendant's purpose was to
try to avoid prosecution for the homicide charge.

Rule 11 of the

Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure allows a court to accept a
guilty plea but does not mandate that a court must accept a
guilty plea when offered.
Utah law allows a sentencing court to impose sentencing
enhancements for the use of a firearms for each felony of which
defendant was convicted.

The statute states that, in the case of

first and second degree felonies, the court must give an
additional one year sentence for the use of a firearm in the
commission of the felony.

The statutory language does not limit

the enhancement to one enhancing term for a single criminal
episode but mandates the enhancement for each first or second
degree felony.

Since defendant was properly convicted of four

felonies arising out of a single criminal episode, the attachment
of four enhancement terms was proper.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT WAS PROPERLY CHARGED, CONVICTED AND
SENTENCED FOR SEPARATE CRIMES ARISING FROM
SEPARATE ACTS WHICH WERE PART OF THE SAME
CRIMINAL EPISODE.
Defendant's brief revolves around defendant's
interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402 (1978).

While

defendant speaks in terms of "lesser included offenses", it
appears that he is really addressing the doctrine of merger in
his argument.

This doctrine will be discussed further in Point

II of this brief.
Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion to dismiss the
Information under Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-25(b)(2) (1982),
claiming, inter alia, that the Information "unreasonably and
improperly br[ought] multiple charges for the same acts." (R. at
100-101).
116).

That motion was denied as being without merit (R. at

Again, at the conclusion of the State's case-in-chief at

trial, defendant moved to dismiss Counts II, III and IV of the
Information, claiming that the attempted homicide and two charges
of aggravated assault were all lesser included offenses of the
capital homicide charge (T. at 1407-1408).

The court took that

matter under advisement at that point (T. at 1419) and defendant
renewed the motion at the close of his own case-in-chief (T. at
1641-42).

The court denied the motion (T. at 1642).

Also after the State's case-in-chief, defendant offered
to plead guilty to the aggravated assault charge involving Scott
Orr (T. at 1419), obviously in an attempt to claim double
jeopardy and avoid prosecution for the homicide and attempted
homicide charges (See Appellant's Brief at 19-20).

The court

would not accept defendant's plea at that point (T. at 1419).
Defendant renewed the motion at the close of his case-in-chief
but the court denied it because defendant had just testified that
he had no memory of any of his actions which were the basis of
the charges (T. at 1643).

Defendant then offered to plead guilty

to the attempted homicide charge involving Tromley as the victim
on the claim that it was a lesser included offense of the capital
charge involving Brown (T. 1643).

The court denied that motion

as well (T. at 1643) .
A. Same Act.
These maneuverings by defendant before and during trial
expose the fallacy of the interpretation of the lesser included
offense doctrine that defendant is trying to foist on this Court.
Section 76-1-402 of the Utah Code states that:
(1) [a] defendant may be prosecuted in a
single criminal action for all separate
offenses arising out of a single criminal
episode; however, when the same act of a
defendant under a single criminal episode
shall establish offenses which may be
punished in different ways under different
provisions of this code, the act shall be
punishable under only one such provision;
• • •

(3) A defendant may be convicted of an
offense included in the offense charged but
may not be convicted of both the offense
charged and the included offense. An offense
is so included whens

(a) It is established by proof of the same
or less than all the facts required to
establish the commission of the offense
charged; or
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation,
conspiracy, or form of preparation to commit
the offense charged or an offense otherwise
included therein; or
(c) It is specifically designated by a
statute as a lesser included offense.
(emphasis added).

There is little doubt that the shootings at

the Silver Spur in Provo, on December 19, 1987, were all part of
a single criminal episode.

They happened in close proximity to

each other and within a short period of time and were "incident
to an attempt or an accomplishment of a single criminal
objective".

Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-401 (1978).

The fact that

they were part of a single criminal episode does not make the
attempted homicide and aggravated assaults lesser included
offenses of the capital homicide.

Section 76-1-402 allows

defendant to be prosecuted in a single criminal action for all
separate offenses arising out of a single criminal episode.
Defendant was charged with four separate offenses which arose out
of the criminal episode of the shootings.

Defendant argues that

the four charges arose out of a single act so he could only be
punished for one offense under that statute.
not a single act.

The shootings were

Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601 (1978) defines "act"

as "a voluntary bodily movement".

Each time defendant pulled the

trigger on the gun was a separate bodily movement or act.
Defendant fired four times at Mike Brown, hitting his body with
each bullet.

Of course, defendant could not be charged with or

convicted of multiple counts of the homicide of Brown because he
fired four bullets, two at least of which would have been fatal

it appears.

Had only those shots involving a single victim been

fired, defendant's argument may have had merit, but there were
other acts by defendant which fully support the charging of
separate offenses involving separate victims.
The charge of attempted homicide involved the threat
against and firing at Tom Tromley.

From defendant's actions the

night of the shootings, it is clear that he knowingly intended to
cause the death of Tromley.

He threatened Tromley earlier in the

evening then took action which constituted substantial steps
toward accomplishing that goal.

He went to Fuga's home and

retrieved the handgun then sought out a person to send into the
bar to see if Tromley was there.

He walked to the doorway of the

bar, fired at Brown, then turned the gun toward Tromley and fired
at him.

The actions of getting the gun and firing directly at

Tromley, coupled with the intent that defendant had expressed to
kill Tromley, constituted attempted criminal homicide.

The act

of shooting at Tromley was not the same act of shooting at Mike
Brown.

Thus, convicting and sentencing defendant for both

killing Brown and trying to kill Tromley was not punishing
defendant for offenses arising out of the same act, as proscribed
by Section 76-1-402(1).
Neither was the conviction and sentence for aggravated
assault committed by defendant on Cliff Argyle proscribed by that
subsection.

After defendant shot and killed Brown and fired at

Tromley, he turned away from the doorway of the bar and ran
toward Argyle and his friends.

Duncan testified that defendant

pointed the gun at him on the street but Duncan was not hit by

any gunfire.

Defendant then pointed the gun at Argyle from two

feet away and fired, wounding him.

The act of aiming at Argyle

and pulling the trigger was not the same act as firing at Brown,
or at Tromley.

Since it was not the same act, defendant was not

punished for a second offense caused by the same act when he was
sentenced for shooting Argyle.
It becomes a closer issue when the charge of aggravated
assault involving Scott Orr is discussed.

Three of the bullets

fired at Brown at least partially exited his body.

One bullet

caused only a superficial wound before it exited Brown's chest.
Orr was standing behind and a little to the right of Brown when
Orr opened the door to the bar.

There was discussion at trial

that, perhaps, one of the bullets exiting Brown's body struck
Orr, causing his wound (T. at 1415-16).

That is a possibility

but the evidence also shows that one of the shots fired at
Tromley may have struck Orr.

Orr testified that his wife was

walking behind him as he was at the door and Mrs. Orr testified
that she was the one Tromley pushed out of the was when he dove
for the arcade (T. at 935). It was at this time that Tromley saw
defendant fire at him.

It is conceivable that one of these shots

may have struck Orr because of his proximity to Tromley and Mrs.
Orr.

The same act, i.e., firing at Brown, may have caused the

aggravated assault of Orr but the evidence also shows that other
shots were fired which may have wounded Orr.
Even if Orr was struck by a bullet which had already
passed through the body of Brown, the evidence shows that that
bullet could not have been one of the bullets which was fatal to

-i p .

Brown.

The two shots which probably caused the death of Brown

were the two shots to the head.

One bullet entered Brown's head

above the left eyebrow, travelled upward through his brain and
exited from the top of his head (T. at 1150-51).

No fragments of

this bullet were found in Brown's head but the angle that it took
raises the inference that this bullet went upward and would not
be a bullet which could have then struck Orr (T. at 1172).

The

other head wound was from a bullet which entered the right cheek
and passed through the brain and partially exited above Brown's
left ear (T. at 1151).

This bullet left fragments in Brown's

head (T. at 1172) and exited in such a fashion that it probably
also was not the bullet which struck Orr..
It is more probable to infer that, if any of the
bullets fired at Brown was the one the struck Orr, it was the
bullet which entered above the right nipple and passed
superficially under the skin of Brown's chest and exited near the
middle of his chest (T. at 1152).

The act of firing the bullet

which passed through Brown's chest was not the same act as firing
either of the two bullets into Brown's brain.

Since they were

not the same act, Section 76-1-402(1) does not preclude
defendant's punishment for both the murder of Mike Brown and the
aggravated assault on Scott Orr.
Since there is evidence which supports the jury's
verdict convicting defendant of aggravated assault on Orr, this
Court should grant deference to that verdict.

This Court has

long held that it would accord great deference to the jury
verdict.

It is the exclusive function of the jury to weigh the

evidence and determine the credibility of witnesses.

"[T]he

'Court should only interfere when . . . reasonable men could not
possibly have reached a verdict beyond a reasonable doubt.'"
State v. Gabaldon, 735 P.2d 410, 412 (Utah App. 1987), quoting
State v. Lamm, 606 P.2d 229, 231 (Utah 1980).

Furthermore,

defendant has the burden of establishing "'that the evidence was
so inconclusive or insubstantial that reasonable minds must have
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the
crime.'" State v. Baily, 712 P.2d 281, 284 (Utah 1985), quoting
State v. Kerekes, 622 P.2d 1161, 1168 (Utah 1980).
B. Lesser Included Offenses.
In his brief, defendant also takes the tack that
Subsection (3) of the statute precludes his being charged and
convicted of attempted homicide and aggravated assault because
they are supposedly lesser included offenses of the capital
homicide charge.

That subsection states that M[a] defendant may

be convicted of an offense included in the offense charged but
may not be convicted of both the offense charged and the included
offense." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(3) (1978).

Defendant's claim

that the attempted homicide and the aggravated assaults are
lesser included offenses is without merit.

Had the attempted

homicide and aggravated assault charges involved the same victim,
Mike Brown, they would have been lesser included offenses but
they did not, they involved other victims.

True examples of

lesser included offenses to criminal homicide, murder in the
first degree, are found in the jury instructions given in this
case, at the request of defendant.

Instruction 4 (R. at 157-58

and 217) gave the elements of the lesser included offense of
criminal homicide, murder in the second degree.

Instruction 8

(R. at 155 and 222) gave the elements of manslaughter.

These are

correctly termed lesser included offenses of the capital charge
because they involve the same victim and their elements could be
established by proof of the same or less than all the facts
required for commission of the capital offense.

See Utah Code

Ann. § 76-1-402(3) .
It is also important to note that the language of
subsection (3) does not preclude the charging of the capital
offense and any lesser included offenses; instead it proscribes
the conviction for the capital offense and the lesser included
offenses.

In the case before this Court, defendant was charged

with the capital offense but was convicted of a true lesser
included offense of murder in the second degree.

The attempted

homicide and aggravated assaults on other victims were not lesser
included offenses of the murder of Mike Brown so defendant's
conviction for second degree murder and the attempted homicide
and aggravated assaults is not proscribed by that statute.

Since

the conviction for these separate offenses was not proscribed,
defendant's contention that the mere charging of the separate
offenses was invalid is without merit.

The separate offenses

were properly charged and the court's refusal to dismiss the
Information was clearly not error.
C. Sentencing.
Defendant argues that the trial court erred when he
sentenced defendant for all four crimes of which he was

convicted.

As stated in this brief, these crimes were separate

offenses and separate punishments were appropriate.

Defendant's

argument was rejected by this Court in State v. O'Brien, 721 P.2d
896 (Utah 1986), in which O'Brien contended that his convictions
stemmed from one criminal episode so he should only have been
given one sentence.

This Court said:

A defendant may not be punished twice for a
single act. Although defendants' crimes were
committed during a single criminal episode,
the crimes were a result of separate and
distinct acts that resulted in separate and
distinct crimes. Thus, under U.C.A., 1953, §
76-3-401(3) (Repl.Vol. 8B, 1978 ed.), which
states, "A court may impose consecutive
sentences for offenses arising out of a
single criminal episode as defined in section
76-1-401," the trial judge was well within
his discretion in sentencing defendants for
four separate crimes.
Id. at 900 (footnote omitted).

Similarly in the present case,

defendant committed four separate acts which became four separate
crimes.
The cases relied on by defendant to support his theory
of lesser included offenses do not apply in this case and do not
direct this Court to uphold defendant's position.

Taking the

cases as they are cited by defendant, each is distinguishable
from the present case.

State v. Velarde, 734 P.2d 449 (Utah

1986), involved a conviction for murder in the second degree, the
charge originally leveled against Velarde.

The issue raised in

that case was whether Velarde was entitled to jury instructions
on the lesser included offenses of that second degree murder
charge.

There was only one victim and one charge in that case

and the requested instructions were for true lesser included

offenses.

This Court did state that aggravated assault was a

lesser included offense of second degree murder, but that was
under the fact that there was only one victim in that case.
Since the original charge was not a capital offense, no
aggravating circumstances were charged or proven, an issue that
will be addressed elsewhere in this brief.
Velarde should be contrasted with State v. Branch 743
P.2d 1187 (Utah 1987), cert, denied, 108 S. Ct. 1597 (1988), case
which defendant does not cite.

In Branch, defendant was

convicted of aggravated robbery of a store clerk, aggravated
assault of a customer who interrupted the robbery, and theft.
Branch claimed that aggravated assault and theft were lesser
included offenses of the aggravated robbery.

This Court

disagreed on the issue of the aggravated assault because "[i]n
this case, aggravated robbery and aggravated assault were simply
two offenses committed within the same criminal episode.

The

crimes required proof by different evidence and had two different
victims."

Branch, 743 P.2d at 1191. Just as in Branch, in the

present case defendant's crimes required proof by different
evidence and had more than one victim.
In the next case cited by defendant, State v. Hill, 674
P.2d 96 (Utah 1983), Hill was charged with and convicted of,
inter alia, aggravated robbery and theft from the manager of a
hotel.

This Court looked at the statutory elements of the two

charges, then considered the evidence presented in the case to
conclude that theft was a lesser included offense of the
aggravated robbery charge.

It is clear that both offenses

involved taking property from one individual only and the facts
supported the finding that, in that case, theft was a lesser
included.

Neither charge involved a capital homicide charge with

its attendant aggravating circumstances.
State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152 (Utah 1983), is often
cited in arguments revolving around lesser included offenses.

In

that case, defendant was convicted of burglary and defendant
claimed that the court erred in refusing to give his requested
jury instruction on criminal trespass.
conviction.

This Court affirmed the

It held that a lesser included jury instruction is

appropriate not only when a crime is truly a lesser included
offense.

The law also requires that there be a rational basis

for acquittal on the original charge.

In the present case, jury

instructions involving valid lesser included offenses of the
capital charge were given and the jury even convicted defendant
of one of them.

The Baker case does not support defendant's

contention that the attempted homicide and aggravated assault on
different victims were lesser included offenses.

State v.

Gandee, 587 P.2d 1064 (Utah 1978), also was a claim that failure
to give a lesser included jury instruction was reversible error.
The conviction was affirmed because defendant had not properly
raised the issue at the trial level.

This Court discussed

whether carrying a loaded firearm in a vehicle was a lesser
included offense of carrying a concealed dangerous weapon and
concluded that the elements were too disparate to hold that it
was.

That case is inapplicable to the present case because

Gandee involved a single act of being in possession of a firearm;
the present case involves multiple acts of pulling a trigger.

State v. Kimbel, 620 P.2d 515 (Utah 1980), is
inapposite for a different reason.

In that case, Kimbel was

charged with one count of felony theft but argued that the
evidence supported only two charges of misdemeanor theft.
Property was taken different times during one day from a single
victim, and then sold.

The Court found that the thefts were a

continuing plan based on takings occurring throughout a single
day.

This theory can be applied to theft or embezzlement cases

but not to the case at hand.

Theft and embezzlement involve the

taking of property which is the general intent which makes the
actual transactions a continuing plan.

In the present case,

defendant intentionally shot and killed Mike Brown, he then
intentionally fired at Tom Tromley in an attempt to kill him.
One of the shots fired hit Scott Orr, then defendant turned and
ran, stopping to fire at Cliff Argyle.

Defendant argues that

this is just one continuing plan which should only be punished as
one offense, preferably one of the less serious offenses.

To

adopt the theory argued by defendant in this case would lead to
the result of a person being convicted of only one offense if he
were to open fire in a crowded place and kill hundreds of people
but only to have intended to kill one of those hundreds.. If this
Court applies the "general intent=continuing plan" theory to the
present situation, the result would be a single, least serious
offense conviction for a murderer.

The State urges this Court to

restrict the language of Kimbel to theft and embezzlement cases
and not apply it to cases involving multiple types of crimes
committed in a single criminal episode with, arguably, one

general intent.

As this Court said in State v. Ireland, 570 P. 2d

1206 (Utah 1977) :
To adopt defendant's interpretation of the
statute would serve only to torture its clear
wording to afford him the advantage of a
single felony conviction.
Id. at 1207.
State v. Bair, 671 P.2d 203 (Utah 1983), is not a
lesser included offense analysis but, instead, is proposed by
defendant for the proposition that the number of victims does not
establish whether a defendant should be prosecuted for separate
offenses.

When a search warrant was served on Keith Bair's

house, officers found some twenty to thirty firearms in a bedroom
occupied occasionally by defendant, Nelson Bair.

Nelson was

charged with three counts of retaining stolen property.

The guns

found in defendant's possession had been stolen at different
times but defendant was not charged with stealing them.

He was

charged with retaining the firearms all on the same day, the day
that the search warrant was executed.

Since the charge was

retaining rather than the actual taking of the firearms, it did
not matter that there were different victims of the theft.

The

evidence proved, not that defendant stole the guns on the
different days that they were taken, but only that he was in
possession, with knowledge of their stolen status, on a specific
day.

Because the defendant's action in that case was a single

one of retaining the stolen firearms, he could only be prosecuted
for one offense.

That is not applicable to the present case

because, as noted above, defendant's actions in this case
constituted different acts within a single criminal episode.

The State agrees that "the test of a lesser included
offense is whether the greater offense cannot be committed
without necessarily committing the lesser offense." State v.
Seats, 131 Ariz. 89, 638 P.2d 1335 (1981), reh. denied, Jan. 20,
1982.

However, defendant has not shown that attempted homicide

and aggravated assaults of other victims are lesser included
offenses of the murder of Brown.

The murder of Mike Brown could

have been committed without the other crimes which occurred.

The

intentional shooting of Brown by defendant did not require the
firing at other individuals which gave rise to the other charges.
Thus, defendant's actions do not fit the test reiterated above to
make the crimes against the other victims lesser included
offenses.

It is long settled in Utah that:
[t]he rule as to when one offense is included
in another is that the greater offense
includes a lesser one when establishment of
the greater would necessarily include proof
of all the elements necessary to prove the
lesser. Conversely, it is only when the
proof of the lesser offense requires some
element not involved in the greater offense
that the lesser would not be an included
offense.

State v. Williams, 636 P.2d 1092, 1096 (Utah 1981), quoting State
v. Brennan, 13 Utah 2d 195, 371 P.2d 27 (1962).

This Court in

Williams elaborated:
It is of no consequence that the evidence
at trial might also establish guilt of
another and lesser crime than that charged.
As indicated, to constitute a "lesser and
necessarily included offense" it must be of
such a nature that as a matter of law and
considered in the abstract, the greater crime
as defined by statute or charged in the
accusatory pleading "cannot be committed
without necessarily committing [such other]
offense." This rule has been constantly

reiterated. . . . The lesser offense must
"necessarily and at all times [be] included
within another one." . . . "If, in the
commission of acts made unlawful by one
statute, the offender must always violate
another, the one offense [i.e., the latter]
is necessarily included in the other."
[Citations omitted; emphasis and bracketed
language in original.]
State v. Williams, 636 P.2d at 1096, quoting People v. Escarcega,
43 Cal.App.3d 391, 117 Cal.Rptr. 595 (1974).
Applying this rule to the case at hand, it is clear
that the criminal homicide charge was committed without
necessarily committing the other crimes charged.
true of each of the charges.

The same is

None of the charges stands in

relationship to the others such that any one of them could only
have been committed by necessarily committing the others.
None of the other cases cited by defendant dictate a
different conclusion.

Defendant's statement that State v.

Turbeville, 235 Kan. 993, 686 P.2d 138 (1984), is similar to the
present case is fallacious.

The Kansas court held that

aggravated battery and attempted murder in that case were
multiplicitous but only because they were based on a single
action of shooting one victim.

The other cases cited do not even

approach a similarity with the present case.
POINT II
THE DOCTRINE OF MERGER DOES NOT PRECLUDE
DEFENDANT'S SENTENCE FOR THE HOMICIDE OFFENSE
AND THE SEPARATE CRIMES OF WHICH HE WAS
CONVICTED.
Defendant's arguments are couched in the terms of
lesser included offenses but really deal with the doctrine of
merger.

This confusion is understandable given that Utah courts

have used these terms almost interchangeably in their decisions.
A careful reading of defendant's brief and the cases he cites
makes it apparent that defendant's real contention is that the
attempted homicide and aggravated assault charges against him
were part of the aggravating circumstance that elevated the
homicide charge to first degree.

This does not make them lesser

included offenses as that term is usually used but, instead,
raises the argument that, as part of the aggravating circumstance
for capital homicide, they should be merged into the homicide
conviction.

Granted there is overlap in the two concepts, but

the State urges this Court to distinguish between the two
doctrines by referring to the aggravating circumstances for
purposes of merger as aggravating circumstances or predicate
felonies and not as lesser included offenses.

See. State v.

Tillman, 750 P.2d 546 (Utah 1987), for an analysis of Utah's
merger doctrine in a different context.
While the argument that the aggravating circumstance
charged in this case merged with the homicide could be made (but
must fail as argued hereafter), defendant does not correctly
raise that argument.

If the merger doctrine applies at all, it

dictates that the aggravating circumstance charged merges with
the homicide for purposes of conviction and sentencing.
Defendant argues that the circumstance "merges" so that defendant
should only have been convicted and sentenced for one of the less
serious felonies, thus precluding conviction for the homicide.
This construction has never been placed on the merger doctrine by
any Utah court and would be a perversion of justice.

To allow a

defendant to plead guilty to an aggravated assault charged in an
Information and thereby avoid responsibility for the homicide of
a separate individual, charged in the same Information, would not
be a correct application of the merger doctrine.
It is also important to remember on this point that,
while so charged, defendant was not convicted of capital
homicide.

As argued in Point I, the statutes do not preclude the

charging of separate offenses but preclude the conviction and
punishment for offenses which impermissibly overlap.
true of the merger doctrine.

The same is

The cases do not speak in terms of

impermissible charging but, instead, preclude punishment for the
aggravating circumstance which has merged into the capital
offense.

In the present case, defendant was not convicted and

sentenced for capital homicide but, instead, for second degree
murder.

Even if the aggravating circumstance in this case merged

into the capital offense, there is no application of the merger
doctrine because there was no capital conviction.
The cases in which this Court has addressed the merger
issue all involve convictions and sentences for capital homicide.
State v. Shaffer, 725 P.2d 1301 (Utah 1986), has been cited by
defendant in support of his claim regarding lesser included
offenses.

While this Court uses that phrase in its opinion,

respondent suggests that the case was decided on the doctrine of
merger and the term used does not change the nature of the
theory.

In Shaffer, defendant was convicted of capital murder,

aggravated robbery and theft and this Court affirmed the murder
conviction while vacating the aggravated robbery and theft

convictions.

In 1980, defendant shot and killed Jack Croasdale,

dumped his body in a canyon before taking his van,
identification, credit cards and money.

Shaffer assumed

Croasdale's identity and used his credit cards and van and spent
his money until Shaffer was arrested in Oregon.

Shaffer was

charged with capital murder alleging that he intentionally and
knowingly killed Croasdale and alleging the statutory aggravating
circumstances of murder while engaging in aggravated robbery or
murder for pecuniary gain.
Under that fact situation, this Court held that the
theft offense was a lesser included offense of aggravated robbery
and that the aggravated robbery offense merged into the capital
homicide.

The Court said:
There can be no doubt that, standing alone,
the crimes of aggravated robbery and first
degree murder are separate offenses. . . .
However, under the test for separateness
found in section 76-1-402(3), aggravated
robbery becomes a lesser included offense of
first degree felony murder where, in the
situation such as the case at bar, the
predicate felony for first degree murder is
aggravated robbery. No additional facts or
separate elements are required to prove
aggravated robbery after first degree murder
based on the predicate offense of aggravated
robbery is shown. • . . If the greater crime
is proven, then the lesser crime merges into
it. Consequently, U.C.A., 1953, § 76-1402(3) prevents the defendant from being
convicted and sentenced for aggravated
robbery in addition to first degree murder
where the aggravating circumstance is
aggravated robbery.

Id, at 1313-14.

The Court added in footnote 3:

We note that this holding must be
carefully read. If the aggravating
circumstance or predicate felony for first
degree murder is different from an additional
_*i _

offense charged, there may be adequate
independent grounds to convict the defendant
of both offenses even though they arise out
of a single criminal episode. For example,
if special verdict forms in this case had
indicated that the jury relied on the
"pecuniary" or "other personal gain"
aggravating circumstances, the defendant
could have been convicted of both first
degree murder and aggravated robbery. Under
that circumstance, aggravated robbery would
not be a lesser included offense since the
jury would not rely on the same facts to
establish the elements of each crime. . . .
Id. at 1314 (citations omitted).
Shaffer is not applicable to the present case because,
as noted above, defendant was not convicted of the capital
offense so any aggravating circumstance charged had nothing with
which to merge.

Neither were the attempted homicide and

aggravated assault charges statutory aggravating circumstances
which could merge if there had been a capital conviction.
Defendant was not charged with committing any felony offenses as
an aggravating circumstance under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5202(l)(d), but was charged under subsection (l)(d) " . . .
knowingly created a great risk of death to a person other than
the victim and the actor."
This Court addressed the use of that factor as an
aggravating circumstance in the case of State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d
1338 (Utah 1977), cert, denied, 439 U.S. 882 (1978).

In that

case, Pierre was convicted of three counts of first degree murder
and two counts of aggravated robbery for the murder of Stanley
Walker, Michelle Ansley and Carol Naisbitt and the robbery of
Orren Walker and Stanley Walker.

Pierre claimed as error a jury

instruction which listed the creation of great risk of death to

others as a circumstance which would justify a capital
conviction.

This Court rejected that claim, saying that the

evidence sustained a jury finding that the killings and creation
of the setting of great risk of death to the other victims
"occurred within a brief span of time in which were formed a
concatenating series of events." Ld. at 1335.
This language was clarified in the subsequent case of
State v. Johnson, 740 P.2d 1264 (Utah 1987).

Addressing the

present statute which lists the aggravating circumstances which
elevate murder to a capital offense, this Court said:
Section 76-5-202(1)(c) states that an
actor commits first degree murder if he
"knowingly or intentionally causes the death
of another" under circumstances in which he
"knowingly created a great risk of death to a
person other than the victim or the actor."
A proper reading of the statute requires an
examination of the manner in which the
killing occurred and consideration of whether
the knowing and intentional killing took
place under circumstances in which the actor
knowingly exposed someone other than himself
and his victim to a great risk of death
because of his knowing or intentional murder
of his victim.

We agree with the New Jersey Superior
Court's interpretation of New Jersey's first
degree murder statute's grave risk of death
aggravating factor. The court stated:
[T]he facts must include a knowing or
purposeful state of mind vis-a-vis the
creation of a great risk of death, that
there be a likelihood or high probability
of great risk of death created, not just a
mere possibility . . . and that there be
at least another person within the "zone
of danger" created by defendant's conduct.
State v. Price, 195 N.J.Super. 285, 478 A.2d
1249, 1260 (1984)(citations omitted). . . .

740 P.2d at 1266-67. The evidence in the present case
established that there were several people around the doorway to
the Silver Spur when defendant opened fire (T. at 921). All of
these people were within the "zone of danger" and supported the
charging of the creation of great risk of death to others as an
aggravating circumstance.
This is similar to the case of State v. McMurtrey, 136
Ariz. 93, 664 P.2d 637, cert, denied, 464 U.S. 858, 104 S.Ct.
180, 78 L.Ed.2d 161 (1983) which this Court cited in Johnson.

In

McMurtrey, the defendant entered a crowded bar and fired at three
people with whom he had argued.

Two were killed and a third

wounded and McMurtrey was convicted of two counts of first degree
murder and one count of attempted first degree murder.

The

Arizona court found that the bar was crowded the night of the
killings and that there were five to nine other people in the
immediate area when the victims were shot.

They said, "When he

emptied his gun at the victims, appellant created a grave risk of
death to those other people." 664 P.2d at 645 (citations
omitted).
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
BY REFUSING TO ACCEPT DEFENDANT'S GUILTY PLEA
IN THE MIDDLE OF TRIAL.
Defendant complains that he was prejudiced because the
trial court refused to accept his guilty plea to the charge of
aggravated assault against Scott Orr at the conclusion of the
State's case-in-chief (T. at 1419).

Again, after the jury

retired, defendant offered to plead guilty to that aggravated

assault, then to the charge of attempted homicide (T. at 1943).
Defendant's theory is that, if allowed to plead guilty to one of
those charges, he would then have been able to preclude his
conviction for the other charges under the lesser included
offense theory.

As noted in Point I, defendant's argument is a

misapplication of the law so the judge's refusal of his guilty
plea did not prejudice him.
Defendant's claim that the court was obligated to
accept his guilty plea when offered is without merit.

Rule 11 of

the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides the framework for
the acceptance of pleas by criminal defendants.

Subsection (e)

states that M[t]he court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or
no contest and shall not accept such a plea until the court has
made the findings: . . . " Rule 11(e), Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure.

Nothing in that statute requires a court to accept a

guilty plea and the judge acted within his discretion in refusing
to accept the plea.

The offer at the close of the State's case

was denied as premature (T. at 1421) and the offer at the close
of the entire case was denied because the defendant had testified
that he had no recollection of the shootings (T. at 1643).

It

was clear that defendant was attempting to forestall culpability
for the more serious crime by pleading guilty to less serious
offenses arising out of the episode. As discussed above, his
theory for avoidance of criminal responsibility is without merit
but would have consumed additional time and effort for the court
to have addressed it.

The court exercised justice and economy by

allowing the jury to deliberate and arrive at their verdicts.

The court was aware that the jury had been instructed regarding
true lesser included offenses to the homicide charge and they
could, as they did, acquit of the capital charge.

With the

capital charge no longer viable, defendant's contentions about
the attempt to enter the guilty plea to aggravated assault
obviating the need for trial on the homicide count became even
less applicable.

Thus it was not an abuse of discretion for the

court to refuse to accept the guilty plea and to allow the jury
to reach its verdicts.
Since defendant was convicted of the charges to which
he offered to plead guilty, his conviction for those charges did
not prejudice him.
POINT IV
UNDER UTAH LAW, DEFENDANT WAS CORRECTLY
SENTENCED, INCLUDING THE ENHANCEMENTS IMPOSED
BY THE COURT FOR THE USE OF A FIREARM IN THE
COMMISSION OF THESE OFFENSES.
Defendant was sentenced to consecutive prison terms for
the four crimes of which he was convicted and was given
consecutive enhancement of his sentence for the use of a firearm
in the commission of the crimes.

He again raises the contention

that this was error because, he claims, the less serious charges
were lesser included offenses of the homicide and therefore he
should not have been punished for them.

The merits of that claim

were addressed above.
The second contention, that the firearms enhancement
was erroneously applied, is also without merit.

Defendant asks

this Court to ignore the plain meaning of the Utah statute and to
adopt California's rule for firearms enhancement.

A reading of

the California cases cited by defendant makes it clear that the
California courts base their rulings on California statutes whi
are totally different from Utah's. Utah's statute and case law
support the actions of the trial court in imposing the
enhancements in this case.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203 (1978)(Supp. 1988), provide
that:
A person who has been convicted of a
felony may be sentenced to imprisonment for
an indeterminate term as follows:
(1) In the case of a felony of the
first degree, for a term at not less than
five years, . . . , and which may be for
life but if the trier of fact finds a
firearm . . . was used in the commission
or furtherance of the felony, the court
shall additionally sentence the person
convicted for a term of one year to run
consecutively and not concurrently;
(2) In the case of a felony of the
second degree, for a term at not less than
one year nor more than 15 years but if the
trier of fact finds a firearm . . . was
used in the commission or furtherance of
the felony, the court shall additionally
sentence the person convicted for a term
of one year to run consecutively and not
concurrently;
(3) In the case of a felony of the
third degree, for a term not to exceed
five years but if the trier of fact finds
a firearm . . . was used in the commission
or furtherance of the felony, the court
may additionally sentence the person
convicted for an indeterminate term not to
exceed five years to run consecutively and
not concurrently.
(emphasis added).

The trial court followed this statute when

sentencing defendant in this case.

Since defendant's arguments

about lesser included offenses and merger fail, defendant was
properly convicted of four separate felonies.

Count I was a

first degree felony and defendant was properly sentenced to a
term of not less than five years and which may be for life.

The

finder of fact found that a firearm was used in the commission or
furtherance of the felony and the court, as required by the
statute, imposed an additional year to run consecutively to the
sentence on the felony.

Count II involved a second degree felony

and the court imposed the statutory term of not less than one nor
more than fifteen years in prison.

Again, it was found that a

firearm was used in the commission of the felony and the
mandatory additional consecutive term of one year was imposed.
Counts III and IV were third degree felonies and the statutory
terms in prison not to exceed five years were imposed.

The court

exercised its discretion and included the additional enhancements
of terms not to exceed five years for the use of a firearm in the
commission of the two felonies.

All of the sentences were

imposed to run consecutively, not concurrently, which ruling was
within the court's discretion.

See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401

(1978) .
Nothing in the statute limits the firearm enhancement
to only one enhancement for all crimes arising out of a single
criminal episode.

The language is that the enhancement applies

if the trier of fact finds that a firearm was used in the
commission of the felony.

The jury in this case found that a

firearm had been used in the commission of each felony committed
by defendant in this episode.

Thus the statute allows, even

mandates in the instance of the first and second degree felonies,
the imposition of the enhancement for each felony.

The few cases which have addressed the issue of firearm
enhancement in Utah have tangentially addressed the question of
enhancements for separate charges in the same criminal episode.
The purpose behind the legislature's adoption of firearm
enhancements was explained by the Utah Supreme court in State v.
Angus, 581 P.2d 992 (Utah 1978).

This Court rejected defendant's

argument that the enhancement provision created a separate
offense which should be separately charged, then explained that
the legislature had the authority to increase the degree of crime
where "instruments of violence" were used in its commission. Id.
at 994.

The legislature had the authority to also determine that

some deadly weapons were more dangerous that others and their use
was "more deserving of punishment." j[d. at 995.

Thus, firearm

enhancements are a valid exercise of legislative authority.
Defendant's claim that his "double punishment" for using a
firearm was impermissible is in direct contravention to wellestablished law. .
In 1977, an amendment to the enhancement statute caused
some confusion in the trial courts which was cleared up by this
Court in State v. Willet, 694 P.2d 601 (Utah 1984).

The language

of the statute, in respect to first and second degree felonies,
reads:
. . . if the trier of fact finds a firearm .
. . was used in the commission or furtherance
of the felony, the court shall additionally
sentence the person convicted for a term of
one year to run consecutively and not
concurrently; and the court may additionally
sentence the person convicted for an
indeterminate term not to exceed five years
to run consecutively and not concurrently;

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203(1) and (2). In Willet, a problem arose
when the trial court imposed the mandatory one year additional
term and then imposed a consecutive term of up to five years in
addition to the one year term, making a total enhancement of six
years for a single crime.

This Court directed that the trial

court alter the sentence so that the total enhancement be five
years rather than six.

The trial court erred in imposing both

the additional one year mandatory and the five year discretionary
enhancements consecutively to each other.
It was not until State v. O'Brien, 721 P.2d 896 (Utah
1986), that this Court addressed a case involving firearms
enhancement in a multiple count conviction.

In O'Brien, the

defendant appealed his conviction for aggravated burglary,
aggravated kidnapping, aggravated robbery, and theft of firearms.
As in Willet, the trial court had imposed two consecutive
enhancements for the use of a firearm but the double enhancements
were imposed for each conviction.

The trial court was directed

to reduce the enhancement sentence to one enhancement for each
conviction but the Court did not condemn the additional terms
imposed for the separate convictions.

Impliedly, then, this

Court has upheld the construction of the statute urged by the
State in the present case.
Nothing in the statute or the case law in Utah forbids
the imposition of separate firearm enhancements for separate
felony convictions arising out of a single criminal episode.
Thus the imposition of the mandatory one year additional term for
both the first and second degree felony convictions, and the

discretionary additional term of up to five years for each of the
third degree felonies in this case was proper.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, respondent respectfully
requests that this Court affirm the jury's verdict of conviction
in this case.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this J£ " day of April, 1989.
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